



ACTION FOR PEACEKEEPING +

SEVENTH PROGRESS REPORT

September 2025

The following 7th A4P+ Progress Report was produced by the Office of the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations. It is the result of a biannual reporting exercise in which United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping missions and relevant departments based at UN Headquarters contribute. The report speaks to challenges and progress made through the UN's efforts to advance A4P+ and strengthen UN Peacekeeping more broadly. The report covers the period between November 2024 and April 2025, and data collection took place in May and June 2025, unless otherwise noted.

A4P+ reports can be found at <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/action-peacekeeping>.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



PRIORITY 1: COLLECTIVE COHERENCE BEHIND A POLITICAL STRATEGY

- Missions continued to support and promote political solutions to conflicts and create environments conducive to peace. In the Central African Republic (CAR), for example, **MINUSCA** is supporting the government to take forward the implementation of the 19 April Agreement between the government and two signatory armed groups that have returned to the peace process by assisting disarmament and demobilization of the *Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation* (3R) and the *Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique* (UPC), marking a major milestone in the continuing peace process. **MONUSCO** promoted regional peace initiatives by providing logistical support for the reinforced *ad hoc* verification mechanism tasked with monitoring a ceasefire brokered under the Luanda process.
- Seven missions have an articulated political strategy, either as a standalone document or incorporated into other mission planning frameworks, such as mission concepts or plans. **UNISFA** approved a new mission strategy during the reporting period. **MONUSCO** is finalizing its political strategy to tailor its political engagement with relevant stakeholders. **UNMISS** is reviewing its strategy to support peace consolidation in the current context.



PRIORITY 2: STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION

- The Departments of Peace Operations (DPO), Peacebuilding and Political Affairs (DPPA), and Operational Support (DoS) endorsed Guidelines on the Mission Concept and Mission Plan (2025). DPO's implementation of these guidelines is expected to improve clarity of strategy, foster unity between Headquarters (HQ) and missions as well as among missions and partners, and enhance the missions' ability to deliver on their mandates more effectively. Stronger planning is especially important in the context of the liquidity crisis and geopolitical uncertainty.
- Missions continued to work closely with UN Agencies, Funds, and Programmes (UNAFPs), including to enable humanitarian assistance and development projects. For example, programmatic funding supported joint programming between **UNMISS** and UNAFPs, with initiatives like the Joint Cholera Emergency Response and a Community Violence Reduction project. The flexibility of programmatic funding enabled **MONUSCO** to promptly adapt to the escalation of violence in the East, and is enabling **MINUSCA** to work closely with UNAFPs to respond to the needs of displaced persons and prepare for upcoming elections.



PRIORITY 3: CAPABILITIES AND MINDSETS

- Efforts continued to diversify and improve specialized training delivery, with new courses and training methodologies implemented through the Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP) and the Peacekeeping-Intelligence (PKI) Academy. TPP added training modules on Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) and explosive hazards. TPP and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) are also mainstreaming C-IED considerations into engineering and medical courses. The number of TPP trainees grew significantly from the previous cycle. A newly established virtual PKI Training Campus provided virtual instructor-led training and e-learning options.
- All categories of personnel deployed in the field met their Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy (UGPS) targets for women's participation in peacekeeping, except for military contingents. Women's representation across all senior leadership posts in peacekeeping missions remains at 37%. DPO completed the review of the implementation of the UGPS, which identified priority actions to take forward. Efforts to promote women's meaningful participation in peacekeeping increased with concrete results.
- Most missions reported that internal training covered topics such as sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), fire safety, explosive ordnance (EO) risk, the protection of civilians, and conduct and discipline.



PRIORITY 4: ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

- After the tragic loss of three peacekeepers during the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in early 2025, a peacekeeper in CAR was killed by suspected Sudanese armed groups in June 2025. These casualties highlight the serious risks faced by peacekeepers, the implications of violence spreading across borders, and the need for thorough investigations by local authorities. One peacekeeper fatality due to a malicious act is one too many.
- UN Peacekeeping continued to take forward the Action Plan for the Security of UN Peacekeepers, where notable progress is being made in improving casualty evacuation (CASEVAC). UN Peacekeeping also initiated a new workstream to improve our ability to learn and apply lessons from security incidents.
- UNMAS and/or missions conducted significant clearing operations to protect peacekeepers, civilians, and enable economic activity, as well as humanitarian and development interventions. With the support of UNMAS, most missions held trainings and workshops on issues such as Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE), Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM), and Explosive Hazard Awareness Training (EHAT).
- Efforts to integrate telemedicine capabilities and ensure adequate access to health care - physical and mental - continued during the reporting period. Although two hospitals had days with equipment failures, none reported being unable to perform surgeries. Missions, HQ, and Member States worked to reduce the stigma associated with mental health and promoted coping strategies, including through the implementation of the UN's Mental Health Strategy for Uniformed Personnel. These initiatives include psychosocial support, training, awareness campaigns, and the establishment of peer-to-peer networks.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



PRIORITY 5: ACCOUNTABILITY OF PEACEKEEPERS

- The UN standards of conduct are the foundation for service in UN Peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping personnel must uphold the highest standards of conduct, which reflect the values of the organization. Personnel and leadership are accountable for proper conduct, including a victim-centered approach to prevention from all forms of SEA, and, where needed, accountability and support to victims.
- Military and formed police units (FPUs) are under close monitoring. UN Peacekeeping implements remedial measures to support units' improvement. These include performance improvement plans (PIPs), in-mission training, and pre-rotation visits. During the reporting period, Military Skills Validations were conducted in two troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to ensure UN standards were met before deployment, while repatriation or replacement of units is also considered where needed. We continue working to improve performance evaluation methodologies, with the revision of the military performance evaluation process remaining ongoing.
- Civilian performance and environmental scorecard performances of missions are only reported once a year and were covered in the previous cycle. Notably, since the start of the Environment Strategy for Peace Operations in 2017, missions have significantly improved their performance, eliminating major risks in wastewater management in the field, increasing the share of solid waste treated with improved methods from 19% to 53%, and tripling the share of renewable energy, now at 10%.



PRIORITY 6: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

- Peacekeeping missions continue to enhance proactive strategic communications to support mandate implementation, build community trust, and raise awareness of their activities and impact. For example, **MONUSCO** promoted food security in Ituri by escorting farmers during its Secure Harvest Operation, an effort covered by journalists and influencers that gained wide national and international visibility and strong online engagement.
- Radio remains one of the most effective ways to reach audiences in peacekeeping settings. In this period, **UNMISS** rebranded *Radio Miraya* to better reflect community feedback, boosting listenership from 57% of the surveyed population in 2024 to 85% in 2025.
- Missions are also increasingly adopting an integrated approach to strategic communications and information integrity.





PRIORITY 7: COOPERATION WITH HOST COUNTRIES

- Missions noted that Status of Force (SOFA) and Status of Mission (SOMA) agreements help clarify roles, responsibilities, and obligations and are considered vital in resolving issues related to movement, privileges, and immunities. While missions recognized their importance in strengthening cooperation with host authorities, the total number of recorded SOFA violations in Cycle 7 is significantly higher than in previous cycles. Yet regular engagement with national and local authorities has enabled certain activities, including humanitarian efforts and community-level conflict mitigation. For example, in South Sudan, the High-Level Coordination Forum, a platform for regular dialogue between the UN and the government on the implementation of **UNMISS's** mandate, helped remove illegal checkpoints on roadways and the Nile River and led to the creation of working groups such as the Committee on UN Tax Exemptions.








OVERVIEW AND CONTEXT OF UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS



OVERVIEW AND CONTEXT OF UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Missions operate in challenging and at times hostile environments. The table below provides a snapshot of various UN Peacekeeping contexts based on externally sourced data and mission self-reporting. Some missions were excluded due to their regional focus (**UNTSO**) and issues with the overlap between country data and the missions' areas of responsibility (**MINURSO**, **UNDOF**, **UNISFA**, **UNMOGIP**). The indices refer to specific points in time; situations may have changed since then. The A4P+ team added colors for illustrative purposes.

	Missions' view of progress toward a political solution to the conflicts 	2023 Human Development Index 	State of Peace 	Conflict Index 	Number of IDPs (*) 
Central African Republic (MINUSCA)	Improvement	Low Human Development	Very Low	Turbulent	469,000
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)	Significant deterioration	Low Human Development	Very Low	High	6,896,000
South Sudan (UNMISS)	Significant deterioration	Low Human Development	Very Low	High	1,360,000
Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Improvement (**)	High Human Development	Low	Extreme	985,000
Cyprus (UNFICYP)	Improvement	Very High Human Development	Medium	Low/Inactive	245,000
Kosovo (UNMIK)	Deterioration	--	Medium	Low/Inactive	16,000

(*) The number of IDPs reflects the situation at the end of 2024 for conflict- and violence-related IDPs, as per the source referenced below.

(**) **UNIFIL** noted significant deterioration until the cessation of hostilities (27 November 2024).

Sources:

- [2023 Human Development Index](#) (UNDP, 2025). Three key areas of human development are considered in the Human Development Index: 1) a long and healthy life, 2) being knowledgeable, and 3) having a decent standard of living. Countries are ranked into four groups, based on their summary measure of average achievement across these areas: very high human development, high human development, medium human development, and low human development.
- [State of Peace](#) (Institute for Economics and Peace, June 2025). The Global Peace Index ranks independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness, using indicators to measure the state of peace across three domains: 1) the level of societal safety and security, 2) the extent of ongoing domestic and international conflict, and 3) the degree of militarization. Possible rankings for the state of peace include very high, high, medium, low, or very low.
- [Conflict Index](#) (ACLED, December 2024). The ACLED Conflict Index assesses conflicts around the world according to four indicators: 1) deadliness, 2) danger to civilians, 3) geographic diffusion, and 4) the number of armed groups. The index levels are: extreme, high, turbulent, and low/inactive.
- [Number of IDPs](#) (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2025).

PRIORITY 1. COLLECTIVE COHERENCE BEHIND A POLITICAL STRATEGY

Missions' efforts to support political solutions to the conflicts

Missions continued to support and promote political solutions to conflicts and create environments conducive to peace. In CAR, for example, **MINUSCA** is supporting the government to take forward the implementation of the 19 April Agreement between the government and two signatory armed groups that have returned to the peace process by assisting disarmament and demobilization of the 3R and the UPC, marking a major milestone in the continuing peace process. **MONUSCO** promoted regional peace initiatives by providing logistical support for the reinforced *ad hoc* verification mechanism tasked with monitoring a ceasefire brokered under the Luanda process.

MISSIONS' EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO CONFLICT

- **UNIFIL** continued working toward a long-term solution to the conflict in line with the principles outlined in Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), collaborating closely with UNSCOL, which holds the primary political lead. The mission also hosted meetings of the newly formed French-American-led Mechanism that monitors, verifies, and helps ensure the enforcement of the parties' commitments under the cessation of hostilities.
- **MINUSCA** continued to promote dialogue and national consensus on the broader peace process and key security sector reforms, helping to advance institutional stability and a comprehensive transitional justice agenda. The mission is supporting the government to take forward the 19 April Agreement between the government and two signatory armed groups that returned to the peace process by assisting disarmament and demobilization of the 3R and the UPC, marking a major milestone in the continuing peace process. The agreement outlines provisions for a ceasefire, the dissolution of both movements, and the creation of cantonment sites to support disarmament and reintegration. **MINUSCA's** good offices helped improve democratic and civic space in the lead-up to future elections. Still, the mission remains cautious, given localized violence, community mistrust, fragmentation within armed groups, and threats from non-signatory factions.
- **MONUSCO** continued to provide good offices to support political processes at all levels. It encouraged dialogue and consensus at the national level on reforms in the security sector, justice and corrections, and natural resource management. The mission promoted inclusive political dialogue following the release of the 2025–2029 electoral process roadmap by the Independent National Electoral Commission. **MONUSCO** provided logistical support for the reinforced *ad hoc* verification mechanism tasked with monitoring a ceasefire brokered under the Luanda process, fostering an environment conducive to regional peace initiatives. The mission also increased its engagement with women's civil society organizations.
- **UNISFA** increased its community engagement efforts. In April, it supported the Twic-Ngok Peace Dialogue in Wau, a four-day dialogue process involving 30 youth delegates from the Ngok Dinka and Twic Dinka communities. The communities signed resolutions aimed at ceasing hostilities, restoring free movement, and promoting joint activities.
- **UNFICYP** supported 48 intercommunal and peacebuilding events during the reporting period, along with 38 workshops and training sessions for women and youth to strengthen their role in the wider peace process. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) continued to hold meetings with the Greek Cypriot Negotiator and Turkish Cypriot Special Representative, providing a space for trust-building and mediating educational, legal, religious, and other issues of concern to both communities.
- **UNMIK** promoted inter-ethnic dialogue to support a more resilient and inclusive society. This included establishing a coordination mechanism to unite civil society actors in supporting inter-community initiatives focused on environmental protection and climate action. The mission also encouraged daily interactions among municipalities, community leaders, religious figures, and local stakeholders.

Highlight from the field



UNMISS organized events, such as a youth forum focused on the constitution-making process and the Political Parties Forum, to build consensus on implementing the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The mission also facilitated 68 initiatives to support conflict resolution, social cohesion, and the implementation of the R-ARCSS, including dialogue platforms at both national and sub-national levels. To address the root causes of violence, **UNMISS** launched a community violence reduction project in Eastern Equatoria State in February 2025, which provided income-generating activities, vocational training, civic education, and psychosocial support, among other services.


In addition, to prevent intercommunal violence during the dry season, **UNMISS** and its partners organized a two-day workshop in November 2024 that encouraged dialogue between Lou Nuer youth and neighboring communities. The workshop focused on expanding cattle trade, establishing auction centers in Akobo and Nyirol counties, promoting peace and exchange visits, and resolving local conflicts.

PRIORITY 1. COLLECTIVE COHERENCE BEHIND A POLITICAL STRATEGY

Political strategies

Seven missions have an articulated political strategy, either as a standalone document or integrated into other mission planning frameworks, such as mission concepts or plans. **UNISFA** approved a new mission strategy during the reporting period. **MONUSCO** is finalizing its political strategy to tailor its political engagement with relevant stakeholders. **UNMISS** is reviewing their strategy to enable it to support peace consolidation in the current context.

MISSIONS WITH ARTICULATED POLITICAL STRATEGIES



Sources: *Peacekeeping missions: A4P+ Reporting*. Note that **MINURSO**, **UNDOF**, **UNIFIL**, **UNMOGIP** and **UNTSO** do not have an explicit mandate to advance political processes.

Highlight from the field

As the situation in North Kivu deteriorated following the capture of Goma, Bukavu, and other locations by the AFC/M23, **MONUSCO** adapted its posture to continue to implement its mandated priorities and support all political initiatives aimed at reaching a ceasefire agreement between the parties. The mission is finalizing a political strategy in order to further tailor its political engagements with relevant stakeholders. In the meantime, the mission concept, adopted in March 2025 to implement Security Council's Resolution 2765 (2024), continued to guide **MONUSCO**'s actions during this cycle, which led to the:

- Effective disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of over 1,130 Zaire combatants in the Ituri province;
- Strengthened engagement with the Security Council and other international stakeholders to foster understanding of key political and security dynamics in eastern DRC;
- Prioritization of political engagement for the protection of civilians during the rapid deterioration of security in the Petit Nord region of North Kivu in early 2025.




PRIORITY 2. STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION

In-mission planning and assessment


DPO, DPPA, and DoS endorsed Guidelines on the Mission Concept and Mission Plan (2025). DPO's implementation of these guidelines is expected to improve clarity of strategy, foster unity between HQ and missions as well as among missions and partners, and enhance the missions' ability to deliver on their mandates more effectively. Stronger planning is even more critical in the context of the liquidity crisis and geopolitical uncertainty.

PLANNING AND REVIEWING PROGRESS

How often does the Head of Mission meet with senior leadership to discuss mandate prioritization and funding?



How often do heads of mission organizational units convene to review progress on the implementation of the mission plan?



Source: A4P+ Reporting. Note that **UNDOF** mentioned that meetings of heads of mission organizational units occur as need arises.

Highlight from the field

To promote collaboration, peacekeeping missions in the Middle East aligned logistical and administrative protocols on issues such as shared use of transportation, facilities, and communication systems. **UNTSO** deploys military observers to serve in Observer Groups Golan (**OGG**) and Lebanon (**OGL**), under the operational control of **UNDOF** and **UNIFIL**, to assist in the implementation of the missions' respective mandates. This contributes to shared situational awareness and operational analysis. Joint cross-mission operations leverage harmonized planning and reporting tools. For example, integrated security planning across missions ensures consistent protection standards and minimizes peacekeepers' exposure to local threats.



CPAS

Missions conducting CPAS Assessments per A4P+ Reporting Cycle

	Cycle 4	Cycle 5	Cycle 6	Cycle 7
MINURSO	✓	✓	✓	○
MINUSCA	✓	✓	✓	✓
MONUSCO	✓	✓	✓	✓
UNDOF	✓	○	○	○
UNFICYP	✓	✓	✓	✓
UNIFIL	✓	✓	✓	✓
UNISFA	✓	✓	✓	✓
UNMIK	✓	✓	○	✓
UNMISS	✓	✓	✓	✓
UNMOGIP	✓	✓	✓	✓
UNTSO	✓	✓	○	✓


Sources: Peacekeeping missions, A4P+ Reporting.

PRIORITY 2. STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION

Collaboration within missions and with other UN entities

Missions continued to work closely with UNAFPs, including to enable humanitarian assistance and development projects. For example, programmatic funding supported joint programming between **UNMISS** and UNAFPs, with initiatives like the Joint Cholera Emergency Response and a Community Violence Reduction project. The flexibility of programmatic funding enabled **MONUSCO** to promptly adapt to the escalation of violence in the East, and is enabling **MINUSCA** to work closely with UNAFPs to respond to the needs of displaced persons and prepare for upcoming elections.

COLLABORATION BETWEEN MISSION ORGANIZATIONAL UNITS



Nine missions reported collaboration between mission organizational units

Sources: Peacekeeping missions; A4P+ Reporting

COLLABORATION WITH OTHER UN ENTITIES

- After the AFC/M23 took control of Bukavu and parts of South Kivu, **MONUSCO** and UNAFPs revised the mission's programmatic funding portfolio allocations. The mission initially planned to allocate \$10 million to seven UN agencies for transition-related activities. After reprogramming, it allocated \$4.2 million to five UNAFPs, including to strengthen the protection of civilians and human rights monitoring. The remaining amount planned in the transition portfolio was redeployed to address other urgent needs due to escalating violence in the East.
- **UNMISS** collaborates with the UN Country Team (UNCT) through various coordination platforms to facilitate localized coordination between mission field offices, the UNCT, and state authorities. Programmatic funding supports joint programming between **UNMISS** and UNAFPs, including the Joint Cholera Emergency Response, a rapid response initiative in partnership with WHO, and a Community Violence Reduction project carried out in collaboration with the WFP, UNICEF, IOM, OHCHR, and UNDP.
- **UNIFIL** has an ongoing \$500,000 program to enhance the capacity of young peacebuilders in South Lebanon, in collaboration with UNICEF and UNESCO.
- **UNMOGIP** noted that the mission keeps cost-sharing agreements with UNAFPs on multiple issues. It also shares premises with other entities and is part of a common back-office initiative with UNCT Pakistan. These measures contribute to optimizing the financial resources available in the context of the current liquidity crisis.

Highlight from the field

MINUSCA continues to collaborate with UN entities in support of the CAR's government priorities. The mission contributed to the UNDP-managed election basket fund and supported the revision of electoral lists. The joint **MINUSCA**-UN Women project to boost women's participation in upcoming elections has helped increase women's registration on the electoral list, from 46.7% in 2020 to 48% today.

MINUSCA provides a safe and secure environment to facilitate humanitarian access and coordinates with OCHA, UNHCR, UNFPA, UN Women, and others to pre-position and transport relief supplies, including non-food items, to hard-to-reach areas. In northeastern and southern CAR, **MINUSCA** works with UNHCR and civil society partners to monitor the spillover of the Sudanese conflict, including movements of Sudanese refugees, Central African asylum seekers, IDPs, and returnees, and conduct profiling exercises to inform response. The mission is also collaborating with UNHCR and partners to improve protection monitoring, community networks, and early warning mechanisms to respond to evolving security and humanitarian needs.

In collaboration with FAO and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), **MINUSCA** assisted in drafting the National Transhumance Strategy and the Terms of Reference for the Transhumance working group. First of its kind in CAR, this strategy aims to address transhumance-related community conflicts, promote sedentary family livestock farming, regulate pastoral corridors and infrastructures, increase productivity, improve animal health and access to markets.

PRIORITY 3. CAPABILITIES AND MINDSETS





Training

Efforts continued to diversify and enhance specialized training delivery, with new courses and training methodologies implemented through the TPP and the PKI Academy. TPP added training modules on C-IED and explosive hazards. TPP and UNMAS are also mainstreaming C-IED considerations across engineering and medical courses. The number of TPP trainees increased significantly from the previous cycle. A newly established virtual PKI Training Campus enabled virtual instructor-led training and e-learning opportunities. Most missions reported that internal training covered topics such as SEA, fire safety, EO risk, the protection of civilians, and conduct and discipline.

TRIANGULAR PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME

The TPP continued to provide high-quality training in areas such as engineering, medical services, and camp security technologies. Compared to the previous cycle, TPP introduced new modules in C-IED, and the number of trainees increased from 367 to 458.

Number of TPP training sessions, trainees, and % of female trainees (compared to the previous cycle)

	# trainings	# trainees	%female trainees
 Engineering	5 (↓ from 7)	96 (↓ from 146)	13% (↑ from 9%)
 Medical	7 (↑ from 4)	129 (↑ from 87)	19% (↑ from 15%)
 C4ISR	7 (↓ from 12)	72 (↓ from 134)	25% (↓ from 34%)
 C-IED	6	161	10%
Total	25 (↑ from 23)	458 (↑ from 367)	12% (↓ from 19%)

Sources: TPP - DOS; A4P+ Reporting

PEACEKEEPING-INTELLIGENCE ACADEMY

During the reporting period, two new courses were delivered, covering geospatial peacekeeping-intelligence and analytical techniques. A newly established virtual PKI Training Campus offers multiple available e-learning courses. The Campus, in conjunction with hybrid delivery to field offices, enabled additional staff to be reached digitally through both virtual instructor-led training (260 staff) and e-learning.

Number of personnel trained, existing courses, and women's participation (compared to the previous cycle)

Uniformed	70 (↓ from 85)
Civilian	57 (↑ from 46)
Total	127 (↓ from 131)
Women %	45% (↓ from 53%)
Trainings Offered	8 (↑ from 6)

Sources: Peacekeeping Intelligence Coordination Team; A4P+ Reporting


PRIORITY 3. CAPABILITIES AND MINDSETS

Women in Peacekeeping

All categories of personnel deployed in the field met their UGPS targets for women's participation in peacekeeping, except for military contingents. Women's representation across all senior leadership posts in peacekeeping missions remains at 37%. DPO completed the review of the implementation of the UGPS, which identified priority actions to take forward. Efforts to promote women's meaningful participation in peacekeeping increased with concrete results.

UNIFORMED DEPLOYMENTS AND UGPS TARGETS

Deployment of uniformed women over time (as % of deployed personnel) compared to UGPS targets



Sources: UGPS – OCSS; A4P+ reporting. UGPS data reflects 6-month averages for most recent data points. Special Political Missions (SPMs) are included.

Efforts to promote women's meaningful participation in peacekeeping operations increased. For example:

- **UNMISS** established a dedicated Force Gender and Child Protection team that handles all matters related to gender and child protection.
- Various missions established regular feedback mechanisms for women peacekeepers. These resulted in specific improvements, including the deployment of a gynaecologist to **UNISFA** and better provision of sanitary products in **UNIFIL**.

Priority actions identified in the review of UGPS implementation include:


- Improving access of women to all roles by supporting uniformed leadership cadres.
- Enhancing gender-responsive leadership through skill-building.
- Expanding the Network of Uniformed Women Peacekeepers, currently active in **UNMISS**, **UNISFA**, and **MINURSO**.
- Enhancing living and working conditions through targeted projects and systematic assessment of accommodations, camp design, health services, and equipment, to meet the needs of all peacekeepers.
- More information about goals and achievements is [available in this two-pager](#).

GENDER REPRESENTATION IN SENIOR MISSION LEADERSHIP

As of April 2025, women's representation across all senior leadership posts in peacekeeping missions stands at 37%. Four women are currently leading peacekeeping operations, including one uniformed Head of Mission (HoM), and three are serving as civilian Deputy HoM. Five of the 11 peacekeeping missions are led by uniformed HoMs. Historically, these roles have been almost exclusively encumbered by men.

The 2024 Secretary-General's Global Call for nominations gave renewed momentum to gender parity and geographical diversity efforts, significantly expanding and diversifying the pool of candidates for leadership roles with record-level participation, including by Member States. Demonstrating the success of the campaign, the reporting period saw the appointment of the first woman nominated through the 2024 Global Call.

Percentage of senior leadership positions (SRSGs/DSRSGs) occupied by women per cycle



Sources: UGPS team - OCSS; A4P+ Reporting

PRIORITY 4. ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

Safety and Security of Peacekeepers

After the tragic loss of three peacekeepers during the escalation of violence in eastern DRC in early 2025, a peacekeeper in CAR was killed by suspected Sudanese armed groups in June 2025. This further highlights the serious risks faced by peacekeepers, the implications of violence spreading across borders, and the need for thorough investigations by local authorities. One peacekeeper fatality due to a malicious act is one too many.

UN Peacekeeping continued to take forward the Action Plan for the Security of UN Peacekeepers, where notable progress is being made in improving CASEVAC. UN Peacekeeping also initiated a new workstream to improve our ability to learn and apply lessons from security incidents.


UNMAS and/or missions conducted significant clearing operations to protect peacekeepers, civilians, and enable economic activity, as well as humanitarian and development interventions. With the support of UNMAS, most missions held training and workshops on issues such as EORE, WAM, and EHAT.

FATALITIES IN THE FIRST HALF OF 2025

In the first half of 2025, a total of 27 serving civilians (10) and uniformed (17) peacekeepers died, the majority from illness (10).

Sources: NOTICASI/UNOCC. Data for 2025, reported as of 30 June 2025. The civilian deaths include all non-uniformed personnel, including UN Volunteers and consultants.


Total number and causes of all fatalities of peacekeepers, January - June 2025




FATALITIES CAUSED BY MALICIOUS ACTS

The total number of deaths caused by malicious acts in the first half of 2025 was 6, representing 22% of all fatalities. This is higher than the percentage for 2023 and 2024. Unlike previous years, none of the deaths from malicious acts in 2025 were the result of IEDs.

Fatalities of peacekeepers per year and % of those resulting from malicious acts



Fatalities of peacekeepers caused by malicious acts per year and mission



Sources: NOTICASI/UNOCC; A4P+ Reporting. Data as of 30 June 2025. Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. The data includes uniformed and civilian personnel (both local and international), as well as fatalities from missions that are no longer active but were still operational during the reporting year.

PRIORITY 4. ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

ACTION PLAN FOR IMPROVING THE SECURITY OF UN PEACEKEEPERS

The Action Plan for Improving the Security of UN Peacekeepers led to progress on CASEVAC and learning from security incidents, among others. A workshop held in Entebbe, Uganda, in December 2024 focused on lessons learned from security incidents and CASEVAC, with participants from six missions and UNHQ.

Overview of CASEVAC-related data


Mission	Updated CASEVAC SOP (Change from Cycle 6)	# of stress-testing exercises	# of stress-testing exercises compared to Cycle 6	Coordination cell that integrates aviation, operations and medical expertise
MINURSO	✓	0	-1	✓
MINUSCA	🔄 → ✓	3	+2	✓
MONUSCO	✓	0	±0	✓
UNDOF	✓	26	+14	-
UNFICYP	✓	4	+4	-
UNIFIL	✓	3	±0	✓
UNISFA	✓	1	±0	✓
UNMIK	✓	1	+1	✓
UNMISS	🔄	0	-3	-
UNMOGIP	✓	0	-2	-
UNTSO	✓	9	-16	-

🔄 Update in process

- CASEVAC stress-test exercises served as no-notice drills to evaluate every component of the survival chain in peacekeeping missions. These exercises shape the CASEVAC policy and guide its implementation. UNHQ collaborates with missions during these exercises to streamline procedures, promote best practices, and deliver targeted training. Missions may increase the frequency of their CASEVAC exercises when updating SOPs, responding to significant changes in the security environment, or adjusting to shifts in the availability of CASEVAC assets. The frequency of these exercises can be significantly reduced during security crises, as conducting drills under such conditions may pose risks to mission personnel.
- **MINUSCA** signed a new SOP and made several improvements to ensure fast and reliable CASEVAC across all its sectors. A Coordinating Cell has streamlined planning and decision-making.
- **MINURSO** received a team of experts from UNHQ to support the finalization of its CASEVAC SOP and assist in operationalizing coordination processes and the alert mechanism for providing CASEVAC support. **UNMISS** also received support from UNHQ.

TELEMEDICINE

By leveraging cutting-edge portable telemedicine kits and advanced satellite communications, the telemedicine initiative significantly enhanced both the speed and quality of medical care delivered to peacekeepers stationed in remote areas of **MINUSCA** and **UNMISS**. Peacekeepers received extensive training to use these kits at point-of-injury to seek expert medical care remotely. 14 facilities underwent digital upgrades, including the introduction of electronic medical records, which broadened the scope and accessibility of telemedicine services for those in hard-to-reach areas. From November 2024 to April 2025, 30 peacekeepers received specialized medical input remotely for case management at Level 1 medical clinics, effectively preventing the necessity for urgent medical evacuations and ensuring that consultations traditionally requiring higher-level facilities could be performed directly in the deep field. This included services related to women's health as well.




Telemedicine consultations by specialty between Nov 2024 – April 2025 in MINUSCA, UNMISS and UNISFA

- **Internal Medicine** (9 consultations, 38% of total)
- **Orthopaedics** (7 consultations, 29% of total)
- **Surgery** (5 consultations, 21% of total)
- **General Practice** (2 consultations, 8% of total)
- **Gynaecology** (1 consultation, 4% of total)

Source: DHMOSH - DOS: The number of consultations is higher than number of cases as some cases were consulted more than once.

BUDDY FIRST AID APP

How missions describe the buddy first aid app



The buddy first aid app was highly rated by missions. It outlines clear standards for the first aid skill sets required to ensure effective medical treatment at the earliest possible time.


Sources: A4P+ Reporting. Missions selected from the following options regarding the buddy first aid app: app is not known, not used, not useful, useful, essential.

PRIORITY 4. ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS


INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMES AGAINST PEACEKEEPERS

Below is an overview of the investigation and prosecution of crimes against peacekeepers. Data is available from 2013 and is reported cumulatively. Compared to the previous cycle, there were two additional reports of crimes against peacekeepers in **MINUSCA**, both of which were investigated. These cases involved fatal attacks against peacekeepers on patrol. In **MONUSCO**, one additional case was reported, concerning attacks carried out in January 2025 by the M23 near Goma, which resulted in the deaths of three peacekeepers. In **UNIFIL**, the Lebanese Permanent Military Court convicted six individuals in July 2025, in relation to the December 2022 killing of Private Seán Rooney. The convicted individuals did not appeal the verdict. A prosecutorial appeal was filed concerning the sentencing of five of the six convicted individuals, and the acquittal of a seventh.


140 (49%) of the reported cases have been investigated by host state authorities




246 (73%) of alleged perpetrators of crimes against peacekeepers that had been identified were detained



146 (59%) of alleged perpetrators of crimes against peacekeepers that had been detained were brought to trial



101 (69%) of alleged perpetrators of crimes against peacekeepers that were brought to trial were convicted



Sources: OROLSI – Justice and Corrections; A4P+ Reporting. In the case of **MONUSCO**, statistics include investigations, detentions, and convictions relating to the high-profile assassination of two UN experts in 2017, noting that they were not peacekeepers. For **UNIFIL**, one alleged perpetrator was detained but subsequently released, while six were arrested and indicted in absentia (and thus not detained). The six convictions are reflected in the dataset due to their significance and relevance to ongoing accountability efforts under Security Council Resolution 2589 (2021), despite being issued outside the reporting period for this cycle. Data from **MINUSMA** is included and pertains to information available as of October 2023. After the mission closure, following up on the cases became more challenging.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING CRIMES AGAINST PEACEKEEPERS

Evolution of key metrics over the last ten years

Metric	2015	2025
Cases Investigated (% of reported)	20%	49%
Suspects Charged	7	146
Convictions	0	101

MONUSCO

- **2020:** Deployment of Forensic Rapid-Response Teams to attack sites

MINUSCA

- **2017:** Adoption of Urgent Temporary Measures slashes investigation times from 18 to 6 months and improves evidence collection
- **2023:** Mobile courts tried cases of rebel-group members (from the *Coalition of Patriots for Change*, or CPC) in conflict zones

UNIFIL

- **2022:** First indictments (Aaqbiye case)
- **2025:** Conviction and sentencing in the killing of Irish peacekeeper Seán Rooney

Source: OROLSI

PRIORITY 4. ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE

In close coordination with UNMAS, missions carried out actions to mitigate risks to peacekeepers and local populations. This strengthened capacities to address threats posed by EOs and included training in EORE, WAM, and EHAT. During the reporting period:

- **UNIFIL** carried out over 300 activities to address EO threats, enhancing peacekeeper safety, protection of civilians, humanitarian and early recovery efforts. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the government of Lebanon and the UN for **UNIFIL**'s assistance in humanitarian mine action was renewed.
- **MINUSCA** continued to provide context-specific EO threat mitigation training, prioritizing its most at-risk units to enable them to operate safely in a complex security environment. The UNMAS Mobile Training Team assisted the Force in drafting SOPs for the disposal, search, and detection of EOs as well as for explosive site investigations.
- UNMAS **MINURSO** verified 6,631 kilometers of utilized routes, ensuring the safety of UN Military Observers (UNMOs) and logistical convoys.
- All incoming personnel to **UNTSO** underwent Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) training to ensure awareness and safety in the operational environment.
- UNMAS successfully cleared approximately 220 anti-personnel mines, more than a dozen anti-vehicle mines, nearly 500 cluster munitions, over 5,200 other EOs, and 33,500 rounds of small arms ammunition in **UNMISS**'s area of responsibility. Clearance operations freed up approximately 2.6 million m² of land, including agricultural areas and key roadways for local communities.

Training sessions and number of participants in training activities targeting local populations

Mission	# of sessions	# of participants
MINUSCA	313	12482
MONUSCO	10	608
UNIFIL	4	200
UNISFA	290	2947
UNMISS	6286	38

Training sessions and number of participants in training activities targeting UN Peacekeepers

Mission	# of sessions	# of participants
MINURSO	21	88
MINUSCA	38	773
MONUSCO	25	540
UNIFIL	13	137
UNISFA	19	532
UNMISS	45	1209

Source: UNMAS; A4P+ Reporting. EO-related trainings vary, with EORE and EHAT being the most common during this report cycle.

Highlight from the field

MONUSCO encountered limitations in its mine action activities in and around Goma following the establishment of control by the *de facto* authorities in late January 2025. The mission was prohibited from destroying EOs in the area and was only allowed to conduct marking and awareness operations, with the marked devices subsequently transferred to UNMAS DRC. This prohibition on EO destruction restricted immediate operational capabilities and increased long-term risks associated with EO threats.

Despite these constraints, the mission collected and safely neutralized weapons and ammunition handed over to the Mission by disarmed Congolese defence and security forces and their allies in North Kivu. Additionally, UNMAS operational teams successfully provided specialized training for the National Defense and Security Forces in Kinshasa, while continuing operations in the Beni area and the Ituri province.



EOs, including IEDs, found and neutralized in missions reporting an EO threat environment

Mission	Total EOs found	% of EOs found that were neutralized
MINURSO	118	100%
MINUSCA	35	74%
MONUSCO	257	64%

Source: UNMAS, A4P+ Reporting. The remaining EOs were mapped, but not neutralized. Note that **UNIFIL** patrols EO contamination and reports it to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) for their follow-up and response, assisting in its operations upon request. Other missions did not have complete quantitative data available.

PRIORITY 4. ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

Health and well-being

Efforts to integrate telemedicine capabilities and ensure adequate access to health care - physical and mental - continued during the reporting period. Although two hospitals had days with equipment failures, none reported being unable to perform surgeries. Missions, UNHQ, and Member States worked to reduce the stigma associated with mental health and promoted coping strategies, including through the implementation of the UN's Mental Health Strategy for Uniformed Personnel. These initiatives include psychosocial support, training, awareness campaigns, and the establishment of peer-to-peer networks.

HOSPITALS IN MISSIONS

	Number of Hospitals in Missions by level				# of hospitals submitting reports	# of hospitals reporting service interruptions
	Level 1+	Level 2	Level 2+	Level 3		
MINURSO	1				0	0
MINUSCA		1	3		4	0
MONUSCO	1	2		1	3	2
UNDOF	1				0	0
UNFICYP					-	-
UNIFIL	2				0	0
UNISFA			1		1	0
UNMIK					-	-
UNMISS	1	4	1		5	0
UNMOGIP					-	-
UNTSO					-	-

Sources: DHMOSH; A4P+ Reporting. Hospitals only submit reports at the 5th and 10th months after rotation. Hospitals are defined as Level 1+ and above.

- 110** The number of days **malfunctioning equipment** impacted the delivery of care in the reporting period, affecting two hospitals in one mission (3.5% of total reporting days)
- 0** No hospital reported an **insufficient supply of consumables** impacting the delivery or care
- 0** No hospital reported an **inability to perform surgery**
- 0** No hospital reported being **unable to accept new intensive care patients** due to the absence of personnel

Sources: DHMOSH; A4P+ Reporting. The numbers represent totals across all missions. **MONUSCO's** service interruption at one of the hospitals was linked to delays caused by stolen equipment at Goma airport, which was en route for repair. It coincided with M23 attacks on Goma in January 2025. Troop rotations in March and April brought new equipment. The other hospital reporting service interruptions had an issue with a dental chair, and new equipment has been received to address this.

Highlight from the field



UNISFA's operating environment in Abyei is marked by isolation, extreme weather conditions, limited local health infrastructure, a shortage of fresh food supplies, and difficult access to specialized medical care.

During the reporting period, **UNISFA** made several important efforts to enhance the well-being of its uniformed and civilian personnel. The mission improved access to medical care by strengthening clinic services at mission locations and ensuring the availability of MEDEVAC arrangements, implementing routine health screenings and vaccination programs to protect personnel from communicable diseases, and enhancing living conditions in camps, including better accommodation, sanitation, water supplies, and recreational facilities.

PRIORITY 4. ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

MENTAL HEALTH

Missions adopted formal and informal mechanisms to support peacekeepers and promote their mental well-being. Specific examples include:

- Multiple missions reported networks of trained and certified volunteer peer helpers providing psychosocial support. For example, in **MONUSCO**, the Staff Counselling Unit established these networks to offer a platform for personnel to share their experiences, seek guidance, and provide mutual support.
- Missions emphasized the importance of support following traumatic events. **UNTSO** established a system to address the management of mental health issues that includes a referral pathway to local and regional professionals as needed.
- Emphasizing the connection between mental and physical health, missions such as **UNMOGIP** continued to promote recreational and fitness activities to help reduce stress. **UNFICYP** also established policies to promote staff well-being and work-life balance. These included various social events designed to build rapport and boost morale among staff. In line with the Elsie Initiative, the mission refurbished both outdoor and indoor recreational spaces on its premises, installing new equipment in the gym and encouraging physical exercise among staff. **UNIFIL** observed improvements in well-being after uniformed personnel were able to resume outdoor physical activities following extended sheltering in bunkers during heightened hostilities, which had worsened mental health issues among personnel.
- Missions continued to report increased efforts to ensure the availability of online and in-person counseling. However, challenges in providing effective access to professionals hindered mental health service delivery. For example, **MINURSO** stated that a planned on-site visit by a stress counselor was postponed due to the liquidity situation. The mission instead used remote counseling and external specialist services.
- The **UN's Mental Health Strategy for Uniformed Personnel**, a UN priority, moved from policy to practice with the rollout of the **UN MindCompanion** digital platform (web and mobile). Launched on 10 October 2024, MindCompanion provides peacekeepers 24/7 confidential access to self-assessment tools, psychoeducation, coping resources, and help-seeking pathways, reducing stigma and barriers to care in high-risk deployments. This digital delivery accelerates field implementation across missions, strengthening prevention, early intervention, and timely referral for uniformed personnel.
- The **Mental Health Strategy** is further operationalized through ten e-learning modules for uniformed personnel, supervisors, and medical teams. A pilot rollout is scheduled for September 2025, with full launch on World Mental Health Day (10 October 2025).

Highlight from the field

MINUSCA offers comprehensive professional counseling services and psychosocial support to its personnel. It strengthened its collaboration with the Critical Incident Stress Management Section (CISMS) of the Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) to ensure peacekeepers receive the necessary resources and support for their mental well-being. The mission implemented mental health screening programs to identify personnel at risk of mental health issues and provide them with timely support. **MINUSCA** also implemented additional measures to enhance mental health literacy, facilitate self-assessment, develop individual coping skills, and promote mental health advocacy. This included the establishment of mental health teams in each sector, responsible for the implementation of the Mental Health Strategy and facilitating the use of the MindCompanion app. Awareness campaigns such as the Annual Mental Health / Peer-Helper Day promoted a culture of destigmatization around mental health.




PRIORITY 5. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PEACEKEEPERS

Conduct of peacekeepers

The UN standards of conduct are the foundation for service in UN Peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping personnel must uphold the highest standards of conduct, which reflect the values of the organization. Personnel and leadership are accountable for proper conduct, including a victim-centered approach to prevention from all forms of SEA, and, where needed, accountability and support to victims.

ALLEGATIONS AND ACTIONS TAKEN

Allegations of SEA in missions by year reported (as of 20 June 2025)



There is an increasing trend in the number of reported SEA cases; however, the majority of allegations concern incidents that occurred more than two years before the complaints were received. It is not uncommon to receive allegations with some delay from the date of the alleged incidents, which could be up to several years. The number of more recent allegations, which are those alleged to have occurred in the year reported or the previous year, is decreasing.


Date of incident: Date or period during which the alleged sexual exploitation and abuse occurred. If acts of SEA took place over a period of time, the reported allegation will be marked for the year in which the acts ended.

Current year (example): An Incident that occurred in 2025 and was reported to the UN in 2025 will be marked as the current year.


Other (example): Other refers to incidents that occurred more than one year before they were reported.

Previous year (example): An incident that occurred in 2024 and was reported in 2025 will be marked as previous year in the 2025 column.

Actions taken against substantiated SEA cases since 1st January 2010



Allegations of serious misconduct (non-SEA) in missions by year reported (as of 20 June 2025)



Sources: DMSPC; A4P+ Reporting; <https://conduct.unmissions.org/data>. Reported records include current missions (MINURSO, MINUSCA, MONUSCO, UNDOF, UNFICYP, UNIFIL, UNISFA, UNMIK, UNMISS, UNMOGIP, UNTSO) and closed missions (MINUJUSTH, MINURCAT, MINUSMA, MINUSTAH, MONUC, UNAMID, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNMIT, and UNOCI).

PRIORITY 5. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PEACEKEEPERS

Performance


Military and FPU are under close monitoring. UN Peacekeeping implements remedial measures to support units' improvement. These include PIPs, in-mission training, and pre-rotation visits. During the reporting period, Military Skills Validations were conducted in two TCCs to ensure UN standards were met before deployment, while repatriation or replacement of units is also considered where needed. We continue working to improve performance evaluation methodologies, with the revision of the military performance evaluation process remaining ongoing.

Civilian performance and environmental scorecard performances of missions are only reported once a year and were covered in the previous cycle. Notably, since the start of the Environment Strategy for Peace Operations in 2017, missions have significantly improved their performance, eliminating major risks in wastewater management in the field, increasing the share of solid waste treated with improved methods from 19% to 53%, and tripling the share of renewable energy, now at 10%.

POLICE PERFORMANCE

Missions can evaluate FPUs multiple times throughout a reporting year, using a seven-point scale, reflected below. All submitted FPU evaluations were assigned ratings of satisfactory or above. Of the 55 evaluations submitted, 7 scored at least one question rated below satisfactory (5 evaluations from **UNMISS**, 2 from **MINUSCA**), primarily in the areas of sustainment, operations, and training.

Outcomes of submitted evaluations of FPUs per cycle



Sources: OROLSI Police Division; A4P+ Reporting. In a given reporting period, a unit may be evaluated more than once; therefore, the data is presented as the number of evaluations, not the number of evaluated units. The substantial increase in submissions from **MINUSCA** in this reporting period is due to the mission submitting backlogged reports that had been pending due to a technical issue with the online tool in the previous reporting cycle.

During the reported period, relevant developments related to police performance include:

- The Police Division, together with missions, conducted 25 operational capability assessments of FPU PCCs to ensure deployment readiness.
- Performance Improvement Plans were issued to all FPUs quarterly, focusing on improvements in contingent-owned equipment (COE), operational readiness, self-sustainment, training, and welfare.
- The Police Division organized dedicated meetings with PCCs to address compliance with statements of unit requirements (SUR) and associated gaps in COE. As a consequence, Cameroon, Mauritania, Rwanda, and Senegal successfully deployed COE that enabled units to support the extension of state authority and implement protection of civilians tasks.

Highlight from the field

During the reporting period, Performance Assessment and Evaluation Teams (PAETs) were deployed to **MINUSCA** and provided recommendations to strengthen FPU management in mandate implementation and COE compliance in line with the Strategic Guidance Framework. As a result, several FPUs deployed new COE, enhancing their capacity to conduct increased patrols and deploy to temporary operating bases in support of the protection of civilians. In addition, performance improvements were noted with the Congo FPU, which was successfully deployed to Sam Ouandja to undertake protection of civilian tasks.




PRIORITY 5. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PEACEKEEPERS

MILITARY PERFORMANCE

During the latest cycle, military performance evaluations saw a reduction in field mission reports, primarily due to restricted freedom of movement in contested environments, which hindered the forces' ability to conduct assessments. Performance outcomes varied, with results ranging from standards exceeded to standards partially met. The military performance evaluation process revision is still ongoing, with a pilot exercise held in mid-March 2025 at **UNMISS**. The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) intensified its collaboration with TCCs to enhance pre-deployment training, which is intended to improve units' readiness while fostering operational effectiveness.

Outcomes of submitted evaluations of military units per cycle



The Monthly Performance Meeting (MPM) continues to be held regularly to review issues of underperformance in missions, including gaps in operational capacity, logistics, COE support, and conduct standards among contingent members.

Notable achievements and challenges reported in this period include:

- **MONUSCO's** Force supported the safe transport of more than 1,300 unarmed members of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and the Congolese National Police (PNC) from Goma to Kinshasa. The Force HQ noted personnel shortages compared to its authorized strength.
- In **MINUSCA**, the Force played a key role in the implementation of the 19 April agreement between the government and the 3R and UPC armed groups, undertaking joint reconnaissance missions with the government to identify and establish disarmament and demobilization sites for ex-combatants. These operations have been critical to overall stabilization efforts. However, the operating environment remains highly challenging. Patrols have increasingly faced ambushes and targeted attacks, while EO threats, encroachment, climate-driven hazards, and surveillance risks continue to affect operating bases. **MINUSCA** continued to develop and update contingency plans for all field offices to enhance crisis preparedness and implement early warning systems.

Sources: OMA; A4P+ Reporting

Highlight from the field

Since the cessation of hostilities came into effect in late November 2024, **UNIFIL** adapted to a new context in its area of responsibility. The Force tripled the number of daily operational activities, including many in close coordination with the LAF. It regained freedom of movement, except in several locations where Israeli forces retained a presence or had installed roadblocks north of the Blue Line. **UNIFIL** has facilitated the deployment of 8,300 LAF troops to Southern Lebanon, its strongest presence since 2006, referred over 300 caches of unauthorized weapons to the LAF for disposal, and removed multiple roadblocks and unexploded ordnance.

UNTSO's OGL also redeployed to Patrol Base West and Patrol Base East in Southern Lebanon after the ceasefire, resuming its regional operations in early 2025. It has progressively intensified monitoring activities and contributed to improved situational awareness and de-escalation efforts. The mission observed that female military observers have played a crucial role in community engagement. Women peacekeepers were central to outreach efforts in the villages.



PRIORITY 6. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS


Strategic Communications and Information Integrity overview

Missions continue to enhance proactive strategic communications to support mandate implementation and raise awareness of their activities and impact. For example, **MONUSCO** promoted food security in Ituri by escorting farmers during its Secure Harvest Operation, an effort covered by journalists and influencers that gained wide national and international visibility and strong online engagement. **UNMISS** rebranded *Radio Miraya* to better reflect community feedback, significantly increasing its listenership. Missions are also increasingly adopting an integrated approach to strategic communications and information integrity.

INTEGRATION OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

Most missions reported that their sections and units regularly leverage strategic communications, which play a vital role in advancing the implementation of their mandates. **MINURSO** noted that the military component has a strategic communications focal point that works closely with the strategic communications unit to raise awareness and implement its communications strategy. During the reporting period, **UNMIK** integrated strategic communications into all programs and activities of its sections. It used social media platforms, the mission's website, *iSeek*, and film screenings to reach diverse audiences and increase impact.

Self-reported level of integration of strategic communications by other organizational units



Sources: A4P+ Reporting

INTEGRATED MECHANISMS TO ADDRESS MDH

Mission	Working group	Analysis & Reporting	Integrated Responses
UNMISS	✓	✓	✓
MINUSCA	✓	✓	✓
MONUSCO	✓	✓	✓
UNFICYP	✓	✓	✓
UNIFIL		✓	✓
UNISFA	✓	✓	
UNMIK		✓	✓
UNMOGIP	✓		
UNTSO	✓		

Working groups, analysis and reporting mechanisms, and integrated responses are different integrated mechanisms to address MDH. Most missions have one or more of such integrated mechanisms to address MDH. Sources: Mission feedback.

Highlights from the field

In December 2024, **MONUSCO** carried out a field trip in Ituri to support its Secure Harvest Operation in Irumu and Djugu, where peacekeepers escorted hundreds of local farmers to ensure their safety during harvest. The aim was to help restore the local economy and enhance food security in these regions. Journalists and influencers from Goma and Bunia covered this Force activity, giving them the chance to gather testimonies from civilian beneficiaries. The event received widespread national and international media coverage. Online, awareness of the mission's activities grew, with **MONUSCO's X account** reaching over 1,000,000 impressions and high engagement levels.



Radio remains one of the most effective ways to reach audiences in peacekeeping settings, especially in remote areas with limited internet access. During the reporting period, **UNMISS** rebranded its *Radio Miraya* in response to feedback from local communities. The mission implemented an action plan that refreshed its radio programming to engage more effectively and reach a larger, more diverse audience. According to a 2025 perception survey, listenership among respondents increased from 57% in 2024 to 85% in 2025.

In addition to its broadcasting capacity, **MINUSCA's** support and contributions were crucial in establishing a resourced network of community radios across CAR to promote peace, security, social cohesion, and local reconciliation, in collaboration with the UNCT, government authorities, civil society, community leaders, women, and youth groups.

PRIORITY 7. COOPERATION WITH HOST COUNTRIES


SOFA, SOMA and Coordination Mechanisms

Missions noted that SOFA and SOMA agreements help clarify roles, responsibilities, and obligations and are considered vital in resolving issues related to movement, privileges, and immunities. While missions recognized their importance in strengthening cooperation with host authorities, the total number of recorded SOFA violations in Cycle 7 is significantly higher than in previous cycles. Yet regular engagement with national and local authorities has enabled certain activities, including humanitarian efforts and community-level conflict mitigation. For example, in South Sudan, the High-Level Coordination Forum, a platform for regular dialogue between the UN and the government on the implementation of **UNMISS**'s mandate, helped remove illegal checkpoints on roadways and the Nile River and led to the creation of working groups such as the Committee on UN Tax Exemptions.


SOFA/SOMA AGREEMENTS AND VIOLATIONS

Host authorities continue to violate SOFA and SOMA agreements, obstructing missions' ability to implement their mandates. These violations have impacted the movement of personnel and may threaten the safety and security of peacekeepers. The significant increase compared to previous cycles is essentially explained by a substantially higher number of SOFA incidents in **UNMISS**. Although SOFAs are a crucial legal framework for mutual accountability, they do not always provide enough protection against violations. Member State support is essential when mission engagement falls short in reducing violations and enabling the missions to carry out their mandates effectively.

How useful is the SOFA/SOMA in ensuring host authorities' cooperation with the mission?



Reported SOFA violations per Cycle



SOFA violations had different impacts on missions, which were also influenced by the actions of other actors. Below are examples:

- In **UNMISS**, SOFA-related incidents mostly involved movement restrictions, which significantly increased when compared to previous cycles. Denials of ground access hindered the mission's ability to monitor security, engage with communities, and respond effectively to protection needs.
- **UNISFA** reported that a logistics convoy was halted by elements of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), with peacekeepers and civilian drivers taken hostage and trucks and fuel seized despite previous safety assurances. This forced the mission to suspend all movement along the main supply route to Kadugli, creating significant challenges for the sustainment of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism headquarters there.

Reported impact of SOFA incidents on missions

	Movement of civilian personnel	Movement of uniformed personnel	Implementation of mandated tasks
UNIFIL	▶▶	▶▶	▶▶
UNISFA	▶▶	▶▶	▶▶
UNMISS	▶▶	▶▶	▶▶

▶▶ No/Low Impact ▶▶ Medium impact ▶▶ High impact

Sources: Peacekeeping missions, SAGE Dashboard (as of 6 January 2025) and A4P+ Reporting. Six missions have SOFA agreements in place: **MONUSCO**, **MINUSCA**, **UNISFA**, **UNMISS**, **UNFICYP**, and **UNIFIL**. **MINURSO** operates under SOMA. Alternate arrangements outline the terms under which the remaining four operate.

PRIORITY 7. COOPERATION WITH HOST COUNTRIES

COORDINATION MECHANISMS AND THEIR IMPACT

- **MONUSCO** highlighted that the SRSG's engagement with the Head of State, Prime Minister, and Minister of Foreign Affairs ensured ongoing dialogue and opportunities for a coordinated approach, building mutual trust among the parties. The mission also noted that regular monthly meetings between the Police Commissioner and the Head of the Congolese police have been crucial in facilitating the exchange of important information, including information related to the transition process, enabling joint assessments and the collective development of action plans.
- **MINUSCA** leadership holds regular meetings with its counterparts across key national institutions to support the implementation of the mandate, promoting the extension of the state's authority throughout CAR. These engagements ensure alignment with national priorities and the Security Council mandate, while fostering a cooperative and collaborative relationship with the host country. Examples include logistical and operational support in establishing the presence of state institutions.
- The High-Level Coordination Forum continues to provide a regular platform for dialogue between the UN and the government of South Sudan regarding the implementation of **UNMISS**'s mandate. These engagements have effectively addressed access issues, such as removing illegal checkpoints on roadways and the Nile River, where humanitarian workers previously faced unauthorized fees. Furthermore, thematic issues raised at the Forum have led to the creation of various working groups, including the Committee on UN Tax Exemptions and the Committee on the Relocation of the **UNMISS** Tamping Base.
- **MINURSO** continued to foster contacts with parties involved in the conflict. It held meetings (at least monthly) with the Moroccan Coordinator and had regular phone conversations with the Frente POLISARIO Coordinator. Additionally, the Force Commander held regular meetings with the High Command of the Royal Moroccan Army. These efforts led to notable improvements in the easing of restrictions by the Frente POLISARIO, including the resupplying of **MINURSO**'s sites. However, arrangements remain provisional.

Highlight from the field

Despite the major challenges caused by recent conflicts in **UNTSO**'s area of operations, the mission reported improvements in its cooperation with all stakeholders, helping facilitate the safe redeployment to sensitive areas along the ceasefire lines. This was particularly the case for **OGL**. In Syria, the mission noted that engagement with representatives of the then-transitional interim governments provided a platform for discussion between all stakeholders. **UNTSO** also reported increased support from Jordan, namely in administrative and personnel matter as well as effective cooperation with Egypt, which enhanced the mission's regional coordination and diplomatic efforts.

During this reporting period, the mission completed restoration work on Observation Post 52 (OP52) with support from Israel and Syria. The reoccupation of the post by **UNTSO** Military Observers in May 2025 marked the full return of the mission's observation system in support of **UNDOF**. This significantly improves **UNTSO**'s observation coverage, engagement with the local community and situational awareness, strengthening its overall capacity to effectively support the implementation of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement.



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